



House Select Committee on Homeland Security Democrats

JIM TURNER, Ranking Member

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At a hearing of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism on "The Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2005," Congressman Jim Turner, Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, made the following statement.

Good morning, General Hughes.

We are pleased to have you with us today. Your mission of identifying, assessing and mapping threats to the homeland is crucial, and we thank you for agreeing to lay aside the comforts of semi-retired life, after 37 years of distinguished military service, to serve our country once again.

We had a good give and take with your boss last week, General Libutti. Today we would like to pick right up with you and talk about the relevance and effectiveness of the Directorate's intelligence analysis given the existence of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and other units doing similar work. The Directorate has faced criticism from Congress, the Century Foundation, the Heritage Foundation and others that it is just a junior partner in the analysis process given the emphasis and focus on TTIC, the CIA's existing Directorate of Intelligence and the military intelligence agencies. We would like to hear you clarify the roles, responsibilities and authorities of your unit and how it differs from the others.

In addition, two and one half years after 9/11, it is a good time to take stock of the government's efforts to do a better job of "connecting the dots" in our intelligence analysis. We have seen the rapid creation of numerous new organizations - TTIC, IAIP, DoD's Northern Command, the FBI's Terrorist Tracking Task Force - to name a few.

To avoid repeating bureaucratic mistakes of the past, though, there ought to be a clear delineation of what your office is doing and the formal analytic interplay between IAIP, TTIC and other related organizations. The left hand needs to know what the right hand is doing, and that begins with a formal, clear, understandable structure to government-wide intelligence analysis. The plan ought to be in writing so there is a common understanding and so organizations can be held accountable. Right now we simply don't have that in place.

Now let me offer some constructive criticism in a number of other areas.

First, I am concerned that the practice of not sharing information within the Intelligence

Community continues to be a problem. For example, I would be interested to know whether your office receives intelligence from DoD Special Access Programs relating to the terrorist threat? And with this new, hard push underway to locate Osama Bin Laden, I can only assume that sensitive covert operations are part of the effort. Are you regularly provided intelligence information attained through worldwide covert operations? In short we need assurance that you have access to absolutely all information the U.S. government has related to terrorism. If you have any doubt about that, we need to hear about it today.

Second, an important part of IAIP's mission is to receive the same intelligence data as TTIC and other organizations but to review and analyze it in a different way to ensure that we are thinking "outside of the box". Al Qaeda and others are considering creative and new means for attacking us, so IAIP is responsible for doing that cutting edge analysis that keeps us one step ahead of Osama bin Laden.

My questions is how vigorously is the Department pursuing this competitive intelligence analysis? If you could note some concrete examples of how your analysts have seen things differently than others in the Intelligence Community, that would assure us that this work is underway.

And on the same subject a Department organizational chart indicates that the IAIP Under Secretary's Chief of Staff is in charge of the Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office. I would have thought that your office, General Hughes, particularly since you're the individual with the most senior intelligence experience in the Directorate, handled these matters. So I'm concerned that poor organization with the Directorate could be hampering this critical function.

Third, in closed session we'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on the extent and effectiveness of al Qaeda operatives working inside the United States. We know they're actively recruiting individuals of non Middle Eastern extraction to blend into U.S. crowds. What about their logistics, financing, training, and attack planning – how boldly are they moving ahead?

Finally, let me comment about your responsibility to map threats against our vulnerabilities. Part of the Directorate's mission, as you know, is to identify threats as they relate to vital U.S. infrastructure, sites and potential targets. But General Libutti indicated last week that the Directorate is some time away from completing a national risk assessment. Since the vulnerabilities have not been determined, then it obviously prevents you and others from mapping threats against those key targets. I would submit that we have a long way to go in fulfilling this basic mission and ought to pick up the pace to complete it.

Let me end by saying thank you, again, General, for appearing before the Committee today. I look forward to hearing your testimony on these issues and fully recognize that you are working hard to defend and secure our homeland. We deeply appreciate your service and want to help you succeed in your mission in any way that we can.

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